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THE PRAGMATIC REALISM OF JULIUS
STONE
Milton R. Konvitz*
I.

Quoting Machiavelli, Reinhold Niebuhr has said that the purpose of the realist is "to follow the truth of the matter rather than
the imagination of it; for many have pictures of republics and principalities which have never been seen." The idealist, on the other
hand, thinks of himself as one who is loyal to moral norms and
ideals. 1 The idealist, said Niebuhr, may be defined as the person
"who seeks to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more
universal law and in harmony with a more universal good." 2 Niebuhr refused to identify himself with either position unqualifiedly
and exclusively. He saw the "relevance" of realism and at the same
time the "relevance" of "an impossible ideal." On the one hand, he
saw the central fact of power. "The historical realists know," he
wrote-and he meant to include himself among them-"that history is not a simple rational process but a vital one. All human
societies are organizations of diverse vitalities and interests. Some
balance of power is the basis of whatever justice is achieved in
human relations. Where the disproportion of power is too great and
where an equilibrium of social forces is lacking, no mere rational or
moral demands can achieve justice." 3 On the other hand, he saw as
universal the disposition "to hide self-interest behind the facade of
pretended devotion to values, transcending self-interest . . . . "
Man, he added, is a curious creature with so strong a sense of obligation to his fellows "that he cannot pursue his own interests without
pretending to serve his fellow men. The definitions of 'realists' and
'idealists' emphasize disposition, rather than doctrines . . . . ""
If realism and impossible ideals are both relevant for judgment,
if one sees all the ironies and ambiguities in the wills and actions of
men and nations and yet refuses to accept the actual or historical
as normative, how does one find an adequate rubric to do justice to
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such a dialectical position? It is a position which transcends the
either/or law of contradiction. "The finest task of achieving justice,"
Niebuhr wrote, "will be done neither by the Utopians who dream
dreams of perfect brotherhood nor yet by the cynics who believe that
the self-interest of nations cannot be overcome. It must be done by
the realists who understand that nations are selfish and will be so
to the end of history, but that none of us, no matter how selfish we
may be, can be only selfish. " 5
Here we see a realism that is without cynicism; a realism that
incorporates into itself a realm of values, ideals and norms by which
the past and present can be judged; a realism without illusions, yet
with a sense of prophetic vision. "It is a terrible heresy to suggest
that," wrote Niebuhr, "because the world is sinful, we have a right
to construct a Machiavellian politics or a Darwinian sociology as
normative . . . . "The historic, he went on to say, is not normative.
"Man may be, as Thomas Hobbes observed, a wolf to his fellowman.
But this is not his essential nature." 8
It is this Niebuhrian realism that, I believe, best defines the
disposition of Julius Stone. One can see it in the philosophical underpinnings of Law and Society (1948), 7 especially the second book,
Law in Modern Democratic Society, which has been seminal in its
influence on legal education, legal thought, legislation and judicial
decisions. It can be seen in The Province and Function of Law
(1946), 8 in which he examined the nature and basic conceptions of
law under three rubrics - "Law and Logic," "Law and Justice" and
"Law and Society," a jurisprudential division and synthesis that
has become well-nigh conventional. And it can be seen in his monumental reworking of the field of jurisprudence in his more recent
three volumes: Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning (1964),
Human Law and Human Justice (1965) and Social Dimensions of
Law and Justice (1966)-which present his earlier scholarship and
thought on a much wider canvas. These three books, together with
the earlier work out of which they have developed, when seen as
interlocking one with the other, present in a masterly fashion the
dialectic interdependence and intertwining in the law, of logic,
justice and society-the analytic separation and conceptual fusion
of fact and value, of reality and ideal.
5. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1971, at 1, col. 2, 45, col. 1.
6. R. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS 214-16 (1940).
7. S. SIMPSON & J. STONE, CASES AND READINGS ON LAW AND SOCIETY (1948).
8. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW (1946).
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The same Niebuhrian disposition of idealistic realism can also
be seen in Stone's notable work in the field of international law, in
Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954), Aggression and
World Order (1958), International Court and World Crisis (1962)
and Of Law and Nations: Between Power and Human Hopes (1974).
Indeed, I believe that his basic disposition comes out best in
some of his writings on international law, where he is at times compelled to bring to bear on a specific question a combination of his
insights and attitudes as a unified intellectual force. What can be
philosophically or analytically broken down into separate considerations of logic, justice and society needs to be somehow synthesized
when a specific problem is under consideration and when a decision
is to be reached. In his concern with contemporary challenges in
international affairs, Stone knows that he is facing life and death
issues. In such an exigency, the crucible of creation forces analysis
into a secondary place, and the thinker's basic disposition comes to
the fore, exposed and recognized for what it is. In his towering works
on jurisprudence, Stone remembers the thousands of books and articles he has read-e.g., a single chapter, chosen at random, of Legal
System and Lawyers' Reasoning contains 318 footnotes. But Stone's
Quest for Survival: The Role of Law and Foreign Policy (1961) has
only a single citation-and that, significantly, is of Niebuhr's The
Structure of Nations and Empires. Quest for Survival is the text of
lectures that Julius Stone delivered over the national radio network
of the Australian Broadcasting Commission; it was not a work written for scholars. In it, a famous scholar speaks responsibly to his
fellow citizens who wanted to know what insights he could bring to
bear on momentous questions that agitated them and the rest of
humanity. This was no occasion when one might be tempted to
substitute learning for wisdom, or analysis for concretion and insight. He had to think as a philosopher but speak as one who had
the right to decide and command.
II.

In the first several pages of Quest for Survival, Stone considers
the question of whether or not the rule of law is operative between
nations today, and what conditions would be essential for the establishment of its operation.
Stone points out that in England-the cradle of the rule of law
ideal-the rule of law is a protection against executive power, but
"in the last resort" is no protection against the supreme power of
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Parliament. Does the rule of law in England have, then, only a
partial and narrow meaning and reach? In answering this question
in the negative, as he does, Stone goes outside the realm of lawyers'
law to society. He finds the essence of the rule of law "in the supremacy of certain ethical convictions, certain rules of decency prevalent
in the community, and in the psychological fact that those who are
at the apex of power share those convictions and feel bound to
conform to them. A duly enacted statute to liquidate H. M.'s Opposition would violate 'the rule of law,' not because it would not be
lawyers' 'law,' but because it isn't Britishers' 'cricket.' " 9 The rule
of law, then, is indeed a far-reaching ideal which does not rest exclusively on lawyers' law but presupposes a certain moral climate in
the community, of which the rulers are aware and which they share.
For its operation, the rule of law has additional requirements
that must be met: there must be a legislature that is "constantly
overhauling the substantive law to keep it in tune with the demands
of the time", and the legislature must be subject to the check of
periodic elections and the check of publicity of its proceedings. 10
The application of these propositions to international relations
was easily made by Stone. Nations cannot be expected to submit
themselves to the rule of law by allowing their disputes to be settled
by binding decisions of an international court when legal rights are
not subject to adjustment by laws which are themselves constantly
reviewed and changed to reflect new conditions and new demands.
How long would Englishmen or Americans venerate the ideal of the
rule of law if the law by which they were ruled were, like that of the
Medes and the Persians, one "which altereth not?"H The principle
of the rule of law implies, then, the existence of a legislative power,
which functions to make new laws to meet the evolving needs of the
people-whether of a nation or of the international community. If,
in the absence of such a legislative power, "we tried to clamp the
'rule of law' on States . . . this would freeze vested rights as they
now are, and make it even more difficult to adjust legal rights to
rapidly changing conditions. There is obviously not the slightest
hope that States will agree to this." 12
But why is there no hope that States will agree to instituting a
9. J. STONE, QUEST FOR SURVIVAL: THE ROLE OF LAW
after cited as QUEST FOR SURVIVAL).
10. Id.
11. Daniel 6: 12.
12. QUEST FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 9, at 5.
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program for changing the law and for enforcing it as it changes?
"The feasibility of this in the international as in a national community turns," says Stone, "on whether the community as a whole
. . . shares certain common ethical convictions as to the basic principles of decency between man and man. But clearly in the relation
of States such shared convictions are the exception. Indeed, some
of the main war-provoking cleavages of today . . . turn precisely on
bitter divergencies of ethical convictions underlying the conflicts of
interest. " 13
Stone concludes this discussion with the judgment that proposals for the establishment of the rule of law among nations not only
do no good, but can do harm. "For the illusory simplicity of the
phrase 'rule of law' obscures the present handicaps of international
law" as a basis for conflict management. And Stone follows this
statement with a quotation from Reinhold Niebuhr: Men, wrote
Niebuhr, are dangerous, not only "because they have . . . unlimited
yearning for power, but because they are creatures of dreams; and
their extravagant dreams turn into nightmares if they seek to realize
them in history." 14
III.

That this realism was not invoked only as an evasion of a complex problem but reflects deep insights and convictions with respect
to the nature of law and its functions, can be seen in Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, published five years after Quest for
Survival. Stone rejects the Austinian notion that power is the only
component of law. In a democracy, the power-holders consider vital
not only the element of coercion but also the people's sense of ethical
obligation and conviction. The heart of the doctrine of the rule of
law, says Stone, lies in the recognition by those in power "that their
power is wielded and tolerated only subject to the restraints of
shared socio-ethical convictions," and he notes that this ethical
component, as distinct from mere legality, "seems sometimes to be
regrettably lost from sight in the enthusiasms of 'world law' and
'rule of law' campaigns." 15
Quite a number of significant truths follow from the recognition
of the ethical import of the rule of law notion, and Stone explicates
them, but for our purposes we will select only several. First is that
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8-9, quoting R. NIEBUHR, THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONS AND
15. J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 619 (1966).
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the rule of law cannot be indifferent to the substantive contents of
law. It cannot operate on the basis of a maxim such as, "It is the
law, right or wrong." Second, there must be in existence and functioning a responsible legislature, which has respect for the dignity
of all persons; for if the law is to rule, it must be a living law,
reflecting and responding to the needs and pressures of living men
and women - or nations, if we think of international law. "This
substantive reference," says Stone, "imports both a minimal justness of rules, and a dynamic responsiveness of substantive law to
the needs of social and economic development." 16 As if recalling
what he had said years before in his radio lectures, Stone added that
a vital insight from this analysis is:
that mere conformity to law in the lawyer's sense is not sufficient
for conformity to a meaningful ideal of 'the rule of law'. In merely
the lawyer's sense it is not inconceivable that the unitary and supreme English Parliament might enact a law for the liquidation of
opposition leaders. Such a law would obviously contradict an important part of whatever we can mean by 'the rule of law'. 17

Stone thus effectively shatters the coziness of the rule of law
doctrine as a simplistic shibboleth by bringing a down-to-earth realism to our understanding of the doctrine. But it is a realism that
does not bring us to the edge of despair by a corroding cynicism. It
is a realism that points to ideal elements which can be found in only
a few parts of the world today. Yet they are sufficient to provide a
standard for judgment within a nation and within the world community. For much of mankind, however, the rule of law is, and for
the foreseeable future unfortunately will remain, an impossible yet
relevant ideal.
While its relevance will continue, the opinion may be offered
that its impossibility has taken on aggravated force by the harm
done to it by the United Nations and some of its agencies, especially
in the last few years. When Florence Nightingale observed the deplorable conditions of hospitals, she is reported to have said that the
least that one might expect from hospitals is that they would not
spread disease. So one might say that the least we had a right to
expect from the United Nations is that it would not spread injustice,
inequality and disorder. There are more than enough of these in the
world without the United Nations making it even worse. Yet what
16. Id. at 620.
17. Id. at 621.
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a careful observer of the work of the United Nations has recently
said about it is tragically true:
In the United Nations, as in the League, a perfect paradox was
created: an institution that would proclaim standards only to undermine them; that would profess beneficence while condoning - actively, or by silence, or through inconclusive debate - every form
of barbarism. These apostasies were enclosed in an aura of righteousness in total contrast to the realities dictating them . . . .18

There is less consensus on respect of basic ethical values in the world
of the 1970's than there was when Julius Stone delivered the Australian Broadcasting Commission lectures in 1960. It is not simply that
the world is divided into various camps, and that each side openly
and honestly proclaims what it stands for, what it believes and what
it demands, and there is no way of reconciling their differences. The
trouble is that parties try to cover their real purposes by proclaiming
principles and positions that they do not really believe. This vice
was touched on by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Deputy Permanent
United States Representative to the United Nations, when he defined the United States' position as it abstained from the vote on
the General Assembly resolution that expressed "deepest concern of
reports of constant flagrant violations of basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Chile." Ambassador Bennett said:
I feel called on to make one more observation. We should not
close our eyes to the fact that there is an element of hypocrisy
involved in the discussions . . . on human rights in Chile. What we
have heard here in the last few days shows the existence of a double
standard toward human rights and . . . democracy.
We appreciate the genuine concern of most of the cosponsors of
the resolutions before us. However, some of the cosponsors have
denounced reported violations of human rights in Chile in the
strongest terms while many of these same rights do not exist in their
own countries. For example, do all of the cosponsors of the resolution
allow members of the free press to circulate throughout their coun-:
try and report without censorship? How many political dissidents,
writers, or others who dare express themselves contrary to the official line of their government wind up in jail, indeed suffer a worse
fate? Even more elementary, how many of the cosponsors of this
18. Hazzard, The United Nations: Where Governments Go To Church, 172 NEW
REPUBLIC 11 (Mar. 1, 1975). See also s. HAZZARD, DEFEAT OF AN IDEAL (1973).
19. U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Positions at 29th U.N. General Assembly, Special Report
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resolution allow free movement of their citizens into and out of their
national territories? 19

It is, of course, true that, as La Rochefoucauld observed three
centuries ago, hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue.
But La Rochefoucauld was a philosopher who allowed his realism
to take him into the abyss of cynicism. Julius Stone, however, like
Reinhold Niebuhr, has not allowed this to happen to himself. He,
on the contrary, has the saving grace to live with the hope that the
time will yet come when the hypocrites will live up to their hypocrisies. On the other hand, his strong sense of reality has kept Stone
from the pitfall of cant.
It may be that Stone shares with Herder the belief that hypocrisy in the international arena is itself a notable mark of progress,
for until modern times nations, states and tribes went to war only
because they hated their neighbors,. hated and feared strangers or
coveted what their enemies possessed, and they made no effort to
throw a veil over their base desires and ambitions. Herder noted
that in modern Europe, governments at least made grand ethical
professions and claims as they led their peoples into schemes of
murder, robbery and plunder. "Gross infringements of international
law," wrote Herder in 1774, "now are so much more publicly apparent and have to be camouflaged by governments in terms of truth,
justice and humanity-a thing which previously was both unheard
of and uncalled for . . ." 20 This discovery did not make Herder into
a believer in inevitable progress. His name cannot be bracketed with
those of Fontenelle, the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, and Condorcet, who
believed in the inevitable march of humanity toward social perfection. Herder waivered, allowed himself ambiguities and compromises, yet never hesitated to associate himself with struggles against
ignorance, cruelty and prejudice. Had Herder known the maxim of
Rabbi Tarphon, as quoted in the Mishnah, he would have been
proud to have quoted and have adopted it-as has, indeed, been
done by Julius Stone: 21 "It is not thy duty to complete the work, but
neither art thou free to desist from it." 22
The philosophy of Julius Stone reflects the pragmatic spirit of

No. 13, at 18 (1975).
20. J.G. HERDER ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CULTURE 244 (F. Barnard ed. 1969).
21. QUEST FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 9, at 81.
22. 4 MISHNAYOTH-0RDER NEZIKIN, Tractate Ethics of the Fathers 2:16.
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William James, who rejected both optimism and pessimism in favor
of a belief in the mere possibility of amelioration. "We must learn,"
says Stone, "to bear . . . responsibilities, even as we learn to acknowledge the finite limits of our capacity to meet them. The unavoidable frustrations of history must not weaken the search for
feasible next steps, nor self-righteousness [to weaken] our will to
understand and accommodate, nor dreams and yearnings [to
weaken] our patience and will to wait. " 23
23.

QUEST FOR SURVIVAL, supra
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